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Distributive Justice and Political Ideologies 
A Rejoinder to Stoian 
 
ALEXANDRU VOLACU 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 In his reply to my article on distributive justice and political ideologies, 
published in a previous issue of Studia Politica1, Valentin Stoian2 has raised a 
number of important points and has paved the way for a more in-depth 
discussion on the concept of distributive justice. Stoian offers three central 
objections3 to my arguments. First, he claims that the view of distributive 
justice which I purport to describe is flawed both because it refers to specific 
distributive justice theories, not to distributive justice as a field of philosophical 
investigation, and because it implausibly narrows down the scope of the field 
due to its incorporation of the notion of a pattern (interpreted in a Nocizkian 
sense) instead of a distributive principle. Second, he claims that one of the 
ideologies that I present in my article as being incompatible with distributive 
justice, i.e. anarchism, cannot be intelligibly discussed within the framework of 
distributive justice since it belongs to a different field, namely that of political 
obligations. Third, he claims that I offer an unfair construal of the European 
Left Platform (henceforth, ELP) manifesto by focusing on a holistic 
interpretation of Marxism and that under a more adequate account, the ELP is 
not incompatible with the idea of distributive justice. In this rejoinder I will 
largely concede the latter point but offer a refutation of the first two objections.  
 Before delving into Stoian's objections let me briefly explain the project 
I set out to undertake in my original article. The core idea of that paper was to 
offer an account of the compatibility between the idea of distributive justice and 
a number of standard political ideologies. Since no such detailed account can 
presumably be realised in the space of a journal article, my strategy4 was to 
appeal to a structural definition of a theory of distributive justice and to examine 
                                                 
1
  Alexandru Volacu, “On the Ideological Incompatibilities of Distributive Justice”, Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2015, pp. 109-132. 
2
  Valentin Stoian, “Distributive Justice and Political Ideologies: A Reply to Volacu”, Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, this issue.  
3  A few other specific objections to some of my claims are also offered, and will be 
discussed here as well, but they do not occupy a central role in his paper.  
4
  Which I justify in Alexandru Volacu, "On the Ideological...cit", pp. 111-112.  
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whether commonly shared features of these theories are incompatible with 
contemporary ideological platforms of EU and US political parties, which 
embody the ideologies in question5. While I concluded that distributive justice 
appears to be highly compatible, and even required, by social-democracy and 
that it is incompatible with libertarianism, anarchism, conservatism, socialism 
or monistic ideologies6, the main ambition of that paper did not necessarily 
reside in these results7, but rather in the provision of some preliminary 
groundwork for linking normatively salient discussions that usually take place 
independently and at different levels of abstraction.  
 
 
 On the Concept of Distributive Justice 
 
 As mentioned in the introductory section, one of the central claims of 
Stoian's is that I mischaracterize the notion of distributive justice in two distinct 
ways. The first way relates to the fact that what I define is not the concept of 
distributive justice, but only theories of distributive justice. The second one 
relates to the idea that I present patterns as being one of the constitutive 
elements of a theory of distributive justice, instead of using the broader notion 
of distributive principles. I will treat each of these objections in turn. First of all, 
I agree with Stoian that distributive justice can be understood as a “field of 
philosophical investigation”, a claim which I do not, however, dispute in my 
article. Secondly, I consider Stoian's claim that I conflate the concept of 
distributive justice with particular theories of distributive justice to misfire, 
since I explicitly state that the formula “justice in setting A demands that B be 
distributed to C according to some pattern D, constrained by conditions of type 
E”8 is a “general structure [which] captures all the major operationalizations of 
distributive justice”9. Thus, the formula means to say something about the 
general structure of a particular theory of distributive justice10, not about 
                                                 
5
  Or, where no such political party exists, directly to some core aspects of the ideology.  
6
  See Mihaela Miroiu, “Ideologii politice: o perspectivă etică”, in Idem (ed.), Ideologii 
politice actuale, Polirom, Iaşi, 2012, pp. 15-34 for a distinction between monistic, 
borderline and pluralistic ideologies.  
7
  I also stress this aspect out in the concluding section of my initial paper: “I underline [...] 
the fact that the conclusions of this paper should be treated with caution, since they follow 
an analysis which aims to be as comprehensive as possible in the inclusion of ideologies 
and elements of distributive justice, on pain of a more in-depth exploration of only one of 
these elements on various ideologies, or alternatively, on the relation between one 
ideology and the various operationalizations of distributive justice elements. These tasks 
will unfortunately have to be postponed for other works” (see Alexandru Volacu, "On the 
Ideological...cit", p. 132).  
8
  Alexandru Volacu, "On the Ideological...cit", p. 110. 
9
  Ibidem.  
10
  As Stoian importantly points out, theories of distributive justice may permissibly not take 
positions on all of the elements presented.  
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distributive justice as a field of philosophical investigation. In my own view, 
distributive justice interpreted as a field of philosophical investigation is 
composed via the aggregation of particular theories of distributive justice and 
nowhere in my original paper do I claim that the field itself is the direct subject 
of my formal definition11.  
 Stoian's second claim, however, reveals a deeper and more substantive 
divergence in interpreting the notion of distributive justice. His argument is that 
the fourth element in my definition offers an excessively narrow construal of 
the idea of distributive justice, since patterns are simply a category of a much 
wider set of distributive principles and any one of these distributive principles 
can be included in a theory of justice. In his own terms, “patterns of distributive 
justice are principles of distribution tied to natural dimensions (such as merit, 
or, why not, height), while principles are simply relevant statements about how 
goods and benefits should be distributed”. He further argues that “the relevant 
meaning of the term distributive justice is that the end result is a distribution of 
burdens and benefits according to a morally relevant rule” and that  
 
“the only kinds of theories to be refused the denomination of theories of distributive 
justice (more because they refuse any type of justice than any type of distribution) are 
those that deny moral equal status to all humans and those that accept that in economic 
distribution ‘might makes right’ i.e. those who refuse to make any moral statements”. 
 
Defined in this manner, we would be able to include many theories 
within the field of distributive justice, even theories such as Nozickian 
libertarianism12, since it also entails a mechanism of distribution (i.e. the free 
market). This way of defining distributive justice, however, raises a number of 
issues.  
                                                 
11
  There is a further, rather marginal objection within the context of the general argument, 
which Stoian also raises in relation to my structural definition and which is also worthy of 
discussion. His claim is that the example which I provide for the operationalization of the 
A term mistakenly includes elements such as the community or the world, which properly 
belong to the scope of justice, not the site of justice. But I strongly fail to see why this 
would be the case. Including the community as part of the site of justice, not the scope, 
entails that some principles of justice should be applied at the level of one particular 
community (e.g. guiding institutions that only constrain behaviours within that 
community), instead of other levels, such as that of the basic structure of the society for 
instance. Surely, this idea might not necessarily be compatible with a liberal view but not 
all theories of distributive justice have to be constructed within a liberal framework. 
Furthermore, the world can also be the site of justice if we adhere to a view which claims 
that there should be global institutions constraining the behaviour of states and 
individuals. The cogency of such a view is not under dispute here, nor was it under 
dispute in my original article, where I merely intended to show what sorts of elements 
might be part of a theory of distributive justice, not to defend the plausibility of any 
particular theory.   
12
  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1974. 
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 First, the idea that a theory which denies equal moral status to all 
individuals should not count as a theory of distributive justice is not in itself 
uncontroversial and requires a substantive defence, which Stoian does not 
provide. In the absence of such a defence, it is not clear why the line between a 
theory of distributive justice (or, simply, justice) and a statement which cannot 
be qualified as a theory of distributive justice is drawn precisely at the line of equal 
moral status, especially since there are authors13 who deny that individuals have 
equal moral status while remaining committed to the value of justice. 
 Second, as previously set out, Stoian's view is committed to the idea 
that all theories that say something about the distribution of “burdens and 
benefits according to a morally relevant rule” should be counted as theories of 
distributive justice. But this seems to directly conflict with another view of 
distributive justice which he earlier expounds (and which draws on Lamont and 
Favor14), namely that  
 
“distributive justice is a field of philosophical (as opposed to scientific) investigation 
(akin to metaphysics but, despite its institutional placement ‒ that is, in political science 
departments, dissimilar from political science proper) in which the competing theories tell 
us something about how primordially economic (as opposed to purely political), benefits and 
burdens, produced by a framework should be distributed (benefits) or shared (burdens)”. 
 
This latter definition is much more restrictive than the former, since it 
requires that the benefits and burdens which are the object of distributions: (1) 
need to be produced within a common framework and (2) be primordially 
economic. But this (largely) Rawlsian account will regard some distributive 
questions as falling outside of the field of distributive justice, questions which 
the broader definition mentioned above will include within the field. Consider 
the following case, proposed by Derek Parfit15:  
 
Divided World. The two halves of the world's population are, we can suppose, 
unaware of each other's existence. Perhaps the Atlantic has not yet been crossed. 
Consider next two possible states of affairs: (1) half at 100 and half at 200 or (2) 
everyone at 145. 
 
Since Stoian's latter account of distributive justice requires that the 
benefits and burdens distributed be produced in a common framework, it 
                                                 
13
  See for instance Uwe Steinhoff, “Against Equal Respect and Concern, Equal Rights, and 
Egalitarian Impartiality”, in Idem (ed.), Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth?: 
On ‘Basic Equality’ and Equal Respect and Concern, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, pp. 142-172.  
14
  Julian Lamont, Christi Favor, “Distributive Justice”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/justice-distributive/. 
15
  Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority”, Ratio, vol. 10, no. 3, 1997, p. 206.  
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follows that distributive justice cannot say anything about the desirability of a 
particular allocation of benefits and burdens between the two populations, since 
clearly no common framework has been established as they have never been in 
contact before. This view is standardly held by authors who understand justice 
to necessarily presuppose a relational element16. On the other hand, since none 
of the two allocations deny that individuals are moral equals, nor do they 
presuppose that “might makes right”, by his first definition17 the allocative 
question would fall within the field of distributive justice since it pertains to a 
distribution of benefits and burdens.  
 Third, and most importantly, if we follow Stoian's definition, whereby 
any theory which makes statements about the distribution of burdens and 
benefits but does not deny equal moral status or fail to make moral statements is 
a theory of distributive justice, and that if it fails on the latter two points (e.g. it 
denies equal moral status or refuses to make moral statements) it fails because it 
cannot be considered a theory of justice, then it is impossible to distinguish 
between a theory of justice and a theory of distributive justice, since the two 
types of theories cover an identical range of cases. But if this is an accurate 
depiction of the field of justice, then the question turns to why we should label 
any theory as one of distributive justice, rather than simply as a theory of 
justice. In order for the notion of distributive justice to make sense we therefore 
require a criteria used to delineate theories of distributive justice and from other 
types of theories of justice. Such a criteria is provided by Nozick, who argues 
that patterns are basic building blocks of theories of distributive justice and that 
his own libertarian theory falls outside the scope of distributive justice since it 
is not patterned. Stoian argues that Nozick's account (to which I also appeal), is 
mistaken, and that Nozick's brand of libertarianism properly belongs to the field 
of distributive justice, since his proposed principles of justice in acquisition, 
justice in transfer and the principle of rectification do say something about the 
way in which benefits and burdens should be distributed in society. My counter-
claim is that the distinction between justice and distributive justice is 
illegitimately extinguished by this interpretation, since theories of distributive 
justice do not only spell out implications concerning distributions of burdens 
and benefits, but make distributions the primitive18 objects of the theory, rather 
than other theories of justice which hold distributions of burdens and benefits to 
an exclusively derivative status. This view draws on Anderson's19 account of the 
                                                 
16
  See for instance Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?”, Ethics, vol. 109, 
no. 2, 1999, pp. 287-337.  
17
  As presented in this rejoinder. In Stoian's original account the order in which the two 
definitions are offered is reversed.  
18
  By primitive I mean that the respective objects are assumed as fundamental and are not 
derived from other types of objects.  
19
 Elizabeth Anderson, “What is...cit”; Idem, “The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck 
Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 1, 
Supplementary Volume 36, 2010, pp. 1-23.  
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distinction between luck egalitarian theories, which she sees as a 
quintessentially distributive theory, and democratic equality, which she sees as 
a quintessentially relational theory. In her view, theories of distributive justice 
have the following characteristics: “Justice itself consists in a desirable 
distributive pattern. Rules of regulation are justified as instrumental to 
achieving this distribution, and people have the virtue of justice to the extent 
that they aim at it. The justice of agents is derived from an independent standard 
of the justice of states of the world”20. On the other hand, relational theories 
“identify justice with a virtue of agents (including institutions). It is a 
disposition to treat individuals in accordance with principles that express, 
embody, and sustain relations of social equality. Distributions of socially 
allocated goods are just if they are the result of everyone acting in accord with 
such principles. The justice of distributions is derived from an independent 
standard of the justice of agents, which involves conformity to principles of 
justice that regulate their conduct”21. While Anderson does not explicitly 
discuss Nozickian libertarianism for instance, it is not difficult to notice that the 
theory would fall in the latter category rather than the former, since it also 
makes the claim that particular distributions are not just in themselves, but are 
simply produced if agents conform to a just procedure22. Nozickian 
libertarianism, as well as Anderson's democratic equality, are therefore theories 
of justice but not theories of distributive justice, under this view, since the 
extent to which distributions of burdens and benefits are to be considered just or 
unjust is entirely derivative on some other, more primitive, feature.  
 To conclude this section, the point is not that Stoian's construal of a 
theory of distributive justice is inherently flawed, but rather that there are 
multiple plausible interpretations of the concept and the literature specific to 
contemporary analytical political philosophy does not appear to 
uncontroversially endorse any particular conception.  In fact, as I have shown 
earlier on, Stoian himself offers two views (which are distinct from the third 
view defended in the previous paragraph) of what a theory of distributive justice 
is, which do not fully overlap (for instance, one of them includes cases like 
Divided World within the scope of a theory of distributive justice, while the 
                                                 
20
  Ibidem, p. 2.  
21
  Ibidem.  
22
  Note, however, that in a different work Anderson (see Elizabeth Anderson, “Justifying the 
Capabilities Approach to Justice”, in Harry Brighouse, Ingrid Robeyns (eds.), Measuring 
Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010 
pp. 81-82) explicitly claims that Nozickian libertarianism is a theory of distributive 
justice, since it does specify a distributive rule even if this rule is an unconstrained 
procedural one. To the extent that in this work Anderson also uses the notion of a theory 
of distributive justice and the notion of a theory of justice interchangeably I maintain that 
her own interpretation conflicts with the view set out in Elizabeth Anderson, “What 
is...cit” and in Elizabeth Anderson, “The Fundamental...cit”, which has been described 
above.  
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other denies that such a theory is applicable for the Divided World case). 
Stoian's criticism is still valuable however, in so far as it presses for a more 
detailed specification of what is precisely meant by the notions of distributive 
justice and theories of distributive justice, a task which I hope to have more 
successfully addressed here than in the original article.  
 
 
On Anarchism and Distributive Justice 
 
 A second line of criticism opened by Stoian concerns the idea that 
anarchism, understood as a political ideology, occupies an illegitimate place in 
my analysis, since it cannot be intelligibly discussed within the context of 
distributive justice. Stoian offers two central claims in order to defend his 
position: (1) anarchism fits in with debates in the field of political obligations, 
not in the field of distributive justice and (2) distributive justice presupposes a 
coercive state and anarchism rejects the existence of coercive states. While I 
largely agree with Stoian's analysis of anarchism, I disagree with the 
implication that my initial argument is negatively affected by his claims. Once 
again, I will examine each of them in turn. It is definitely true that philosophical 
(and, perhaps, ideological) anarchism normally counterposes with the idea that 
we have duties or obligations to abide by state authority, a discussion which 
does indeed take place within the philosophical field of political obligations. 
But this does not prevent us from examining possible implications of 
ideological anarchism in connection to the idea of distributive justice, since the 
conclusions might be that the two notions are simply incompatible. In my 
article I wrote that  
 
“the pattern element is incompatible [...] with anarchism, in both the individualist and 
collectivist versions, since the common thread which runs through both of them is that 
anarchism is the approach which considers that all forms of human association must be 
voluntary”23. 
 
  Thus, anarchism has distributive implications, since it does say 
something about the way in which benefits and burdens should be distributed in 
a specific group, but, much like libertarianism, the distributive implications are 
only derivative since the theory is not patterned, thereby falling outside the 
purview of distributive justice. Maintaining Stoian's analogy that anarchism and 
theories of distributive justice are different fish in different ponds, I would 
argue that I never claimed that anarchism is a fish in the pond of distributive 
justice, but I merely offered one reason for why anarchism cannot swim in that 
particular pond.  
                                                 
23
  Alexandru Volacu, “On the Ideological...cit.”, p. 115. 
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 Such a reason is also provided by Stoian in his second claim, where he 
once again appeals to the Rawlsian definition of a theory of distributive justice in 
order to argue that we cannot discuss about such theories outside the framework of 
a coercive state. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that this is right and that in 
order for something to count as a theory of distributive justice we need a commonly 
shared framework for the production of benefits and a coercive mechanism through 
which distribution would be achieved (although this is by no means 
uncontroversial). The conclusion which we should draw is then simply that 
ideological anarchism is incompatible with distributive justice, a conclusion which I 
also draw using a different argument. Now, it might be objected (although I find it 
implausible) that my argument is mistaken since the absence of a pattern is 
insufficient for the exclusion of a theory from the field of theories of distributive 
justice, but Stoian's argument does not advance a substantive claim of this type, 
merely offering instead a different argument which leads to the same conclusion as 
my own. I therefore fail to see how either of Stoian's two claims show that my 
argument that anarchism is incompatible with distributive justice is wrong, since 
they either explicitly state the same conclusion (the first claim) or also argue in 
favour of it through different means (the second claim). 
 
 
On the ELP, Marxism and Distributive Justice 
 
 A final major objection offered by Stoian concerns my conclusion that 
socialism, as embodied by the European Left Platform, is incompatible with 
distributive justice. The argument I originally offered24 was that the ELP draws 
on a Marxist interpretations of society which does not allow any place for 
individual responsibility, a constraint which I argued is central in mainstream 
theories of distributive justice. Two types of arguments can be deployed against 
my initial position: (1) the Marxist account which underlies the ELP's 
discussion of class struggle does not preclude considerations of individual 
responsibility from entering the picture and (2) individual responsibility is not 
essential to a theory of distributive justice. Stoian has opted to take the first of 
these routes and in this process he has launched into an ample discussion on the 
more general relation between Marxism and distributive justice. While I do not 
question the soundness of his analysis of Marxism or the importance which this 
analysis has on its own, only a very specific part engages with my own 
arguments, namely the discussion on holism/individualism. Here, Stoian argues 
that while the holistic account which I adhere to has been a common thread in 
the history of Marxism, more recent accounts belonging to the field of 
Analytical Marxism dispense with the standard view and provide individualistic 
                                                 
24
  Ibidem, p. 119.  
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interpretations of the Marxist framework. I think that Stoian is right in pointing 
out that if Analytical Marxism can be used to discuss concepts such as class 
struggle in individualistic terms (and I see no reason to reject this idea), my 
initial conclusion regarding the ELP Manifesto fails. Furthermore, the second 
route described above can also plausibly be taken and while I also point to it in 
my original text25 as a potential caveat, I now consider that it decisively refutes 
my original claim concerning socialism and the ELP. As discussed in my 
original paper, individual responsibility can be interpreted as a constraint placed 
on the pattern of distribution26. While it is true that a wide range of the most 
salient theories of distributive justice do make room for some form of individual 
responsibility27, other theories of distributive justice may plausibly be constructed 
in the absence of such a constraint28 and if our methodological strategy is to 
examine the link between ideologies and commonly-shared core features of 
theories of distributive justice it is highly questionable that ideologies which do 
not take individual responsibility seriously should be rejected as incompatible 
with the idea of distributive justice, as I previously suggested. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 In conclusion, I am grateful to Stoian for his insightful criticism of 
some of the positions which I held in my original article. While I disagree with 
his conclusion on the question of what it means for a theory to count as a theory 
                                                 
25
  Ibidem, p. 118.  
26
  Other values, aside from that of responsibility, might also constrain the distributive 
pattern, such as efficiency (see Bertil Tungodden, Peter Vallentyne, “On the Possibility of 
Paretian Egalitarianism”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 102, no. 3, 2005, pp. 126-154), 
fairness (see Alexandru Volacu, Oana Dervis, “Pluralist Welfare Egalitarianism and the 
Expensive Tastes Objection”, Contemporary Political Theory, Advanced Online 
Publication, doi: 10.1057/cpt.2015.67, 2015) or others.  
27
  See Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4, 1981, pp. 183-345; Amartya Sen, “Well-Being, Agency and 
Freedom”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 82, no. 4, 1985, pp. 169-221; Richard Arneson, 
“Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 
1989, pp. 77-93; Gerald Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, Ethics, vol. 99, 
no. 4, 1989, pp. 906-944; Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1991; John Roemer, “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian 
Planner”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 22, no. 2, 1993, pp. 146-166; Richard 
Arneson, “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism”, Ethics, vol. 110, no. 2, 2000, 
pp. 339-349; Serena Olsaretti, “Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice”, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 109, no.1, 2009, pp. 165-188; Zofia 
Stemplowska, “Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility”, Political Studies, vol. 57, no. 2, 
2009, pp. 237-259. 
28
  See for instance Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Deontology, Responsibility, and Equality, 
University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, 2005.  
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of distributive justice and with his conclusion on my assessment of the 
incompatibility between ideological anarchism and distributive justice, his 
comments have opened the way for a deeper discussion on these matters and 
have helped me to clarify my initial positions in a sharper way. Furthermore, I 
find his main objection to my construal of the incompatibility between 
socialism and distributive justice convincing and, together with the second 
argument I have offered in the previous section, it has led me to recant my 
initial position on the issue. On the wider project outlined in the initial article, 
which seeks to examine political ideologies in terms of their relation with more 
abstract normative concepts (such as distributive justice) the bulk of work 
remains, however, to be done. On this topic, as well, I agree with Stoian in 
claiming that “the best comparison should [...] be between individual theories of 
distributive justice and individual ideologies” rather than by comparing 
ideologies with commonly shared core features of theories of distributive justice 
as I have done, but I retain the hope that the broad analysis advanced in my 
original paper can be construed as a plausible preliminary groundwork for more 
in-depth future studies.  
 
